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Tax Reform and Investment:
Blessing or Curse?
Steven Al. Fazzari
number of recent studies have concluded that
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 will reduce capital spend-
ing incentives in the United States.’ Manyanalysts fear
this result.
There is, however, an alternative view. By removing
special subsidies for various kinds of investment, tax
reform may encourage firms to invest in projects be-
cause they have high economic returns, rather than
large tax benefits. Jf economic returns more closely
reflect social values than the previous tax subsidies,
investments could be better suited under tax reform to
produce goods and services that people want and
enhance the productivity of the economy. Thus, the
recent reform ofcapital taxation may actuallyimprove
econothic welfare, even though it reduces the aggre-
gate capital stock and investment. This paper investi-
gates the welfare implications of the new capital tax
system.
THE EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF
CAPITAL RESOURCES
In many popular discussions of taxes and invest-
ment lurks an implicit assumption that more invest-
ment is always better than less. After all, investment
causes thecapital stock to expand, increases potential
output growth and enhances labor productivity. While
these outcomes are undoubtedly desirable, the simple
view that investment is always beneficial ignores the
costs imposed by greater capital accumulation. By
investing resources in more productive capital,people
forego the opportunity to consume some goods and
services. Thus, investment generates opportunity
costs.’
To evaluate whatever changing levels of investment
improve social welfare, one needs a criterion that
incorporates both the costs and benefits ofchanges in
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‘See, for example, Prakken (1986), Henderson (1986), Aaron
(1987), the Economic Report of the President (1987) and Fazzari
(1987).
‘The opportunity costs associated with investment may be best
illustrated by an extreme case. Suppose all of a society’s output
were invested in capital goods. Growth would be maximized, but
there would be no current consumption at all. This perspective
emphasizes the trade-offs between investment and consumption.
One could also consider the efficiency of the allocation of total
investment among different capital projects; this topic, however, is
outside the scope of this article.
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the capital stock. The most widely used criterion that
meets this objective is economic efficiency.’A particu-
lar level ofinvestment is efficient if the benefits of all
projects undertaken exceed their cost while the
benefits of investment projects foregone fall short of
their costs. Let us consider this concept in more
detail.
The benefit gained from a marginal investment has
two dimensions: the amount of new output the in-
vestment produces and the length of time it takes for
this additional output to become available. Consider
an investment project thatincreases output by Y units
at the end of its first yearof production. Assume that
the project depreciates at a constant annual i-ate
d < 1, so that it produces (1 —dl Y units of output at
the endof the secondyear, (1 — d)’Yunits at the end of
the thirdyear, etc. Ingeneral, the project will produce
(1 — d)’’Y units of additional output at the end of
year t.
Let P represent the market price of the output that
individuals are willing to pay for additional units of
this good. According to the economic efficiency cri-
terion, this pricerepresents the current value ofaunit
of output.’ Thus, the social value of an investment
project in any year will be the quantity of additional
output it produces multiplied by the goods’ market
price.
The concept of time preference implies that for a
variety of reasons (impatience, uncertainty and atti-
tude toward risk, for example), individuals wouldpre-
ferto havegoodsand services sooner rather than later.
Thus, the value of a given bundle of goods is smaller
the further in the future it becomes available.
A simple way of expressing this idea formally is to
assume that individuals discount the value ofoutput
available in the future, relative to the value ofcurrent
output, at a constant rate r, where r is a positive
fraction.Thus, ifabundle ofconsumption goodsavail-
able today has a value of $10, the present value of the
same bundle delivered a year from now will be $10~
11 +r). Ifit is delivered in two years, it will have a lower
present value, $10/(1 + r)’. Ingeneral, thepresent value
‘Although efficiency is the most widely used welfare criterion, it does
not address some significant welfare issues. Most important, the
efficiency criterion does not deal with the equity ofchanges in wealth
distributions caused by policy changes.
‘There are important limitations to the view that the market price
measures the value of output because this measure does not
incorporate any concept ofdistributional equity. Theefficiencycrite-
rion remains meaningful for any given distribution of wealth, but it
cannot be used to evaluate the implications of changing wealth
distributions.
ofoutput that is worth PYat atime t years in thefuture
is PY/(1+r)’.
These concepts allowus to construct an expression
for the present value (VI of an investment project that
increases output in each future period t by (1— d)’’Y
units. The output hasaconstant market price ofP. The
present value is:




Toattain economic efficiency, anyproject shouldbe
undertaken that has a present value exceeding its
present cost, the market price of the capital project
denoted by P0. Thus, efficiencyrequires investment up
to the point where the least-valued project under-
taken has a productivity Y that satisfies:
= V = PY/(r+d), or
(1) (r+d) p, =
The efficiency condition given by equation 1 has a
natural graphical interpretation. Rewrite equation 1 as:
(2) PY—dP,rP0.
The right side represents the cost of deferring con—
sumption. In figure 1, this cost rises as the capital
stock expands because the more resources that are
deferred away from consumption into capital, the
greater the premium individuals require to compen-
sate them for their time preference. The left side of
equation 2 represents the net output created by an
investment project after allowing for the depreciation
ofcapital. In figure 1, this net marginalbenefit from the
least productive investment falls as the capital stock
increases.
‘This simplification is based on the fact that the geometric series
‘S
is (1 —a)’. Thus,
t’So
1—dt PY ~: (1—d)t11
— ~t=1 ~i;-P T~d~tO 1 +r
1—d [(1_1~~)_1 —1] = f’~aTr= PY/(d+r).
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F,gure I
Capital Stock and Economic Efficiency
Dollars
Suppose the capital stock is K1 as shown in figure 1.
New investment, on net, will produce new output
valued at V,, in the market, but individuals are willing
torelease the current resources necessaryto carry out
the investment for a payment of onlyV
1
. Unexploited
gains to new investment exist, therefore, and K1 is not
the efficient capital stnck. On the other hand, the
marginal costs of the least-valued investment project
exceed its net benefits at a capital stock of KB. Ef-
ficiency then requires a decrease in investment and
capital. Only at K’, where equation 2 is satisfied, have
all gains from changing the capital stock been ex-
ploited. This level gives an economically efficient capi-
tal stock.
Profits and Firm Investment Decisions
A market economy has an efficient rate of invest-
ment and level of capital stock if firms undertake
projects up to the point where the least productive
investment satisfies equation 1. Firms, of course, are
motivated by profit; they will invest in projects that
increase their shareholders’ wealth. An investment
project will be profitable ifits net revenue exceeds its
cost to the firm. The revenue gained from investment
will be the net output produced by the new capital (Y,
initially) multiplied by the priceofoutput (P1. The cost
to the firm consists of depreciation and real interest
earnings foregone by investing funds in fixed capital
rather than financial assets.’
A firm’s capital investment will be profitable if:
PY> P0d + P
0
i,
where i represents the real rate of interest the firm
foregoes by investing in fixed capital. Thus, firms will
invest up to the pointwhere
(3) I’Y = P~(d+i).’
Note that equation 3 looks almost the same as equa-
tion 1. They will be the same if the real market rate of
interest (i in equation 3) equals individuals’ discount
rate (r in equation 1). This point will be addressed
Net Marginal
below.
In spite of their close similarity, it is important to
understand the conceptual distinction between equa-
tions I and 3. Equation I defines awelfarestandard for
investment and the capital stock according to the
efficiency criterion. On the othei hand, equation 2
describes the level of investment profit-maximizing
firms will undertake in the market.
Much economic analysis has been devoted to un-
derstanding the conditions under which economic
efficiencywill be attained by themarket. To obtain this
result for the market analyzed here, the interest rate
must equal individuals’ discount rate. The real inter-
est i—ate represents the opportunity cost to firms of
borrowing funds for capital investment. It also is the
return to savers who give up the chance to consume
today by lending, either directly or through financial
intermediaries.
Suppose individuals decide that theywant to con-
sume more today. They reduce their saving, decreas-
ing the supply of funds flowing into credit markets,
drivingup interest rates.This continues until individ-
uals are satisfied with the current levelof savingat the
prevailing market interest rate. Thus, the interest rate
measures individuals’ discount rate at the margin, the
premium they require to exchange some consump-
tion now forconsumption in the future in the absence
of personal taxes on interest income. Under these
circumstances, the interest rate equals the discount
rate (i’ r), and equations 1 and 3 determine identical
levels ofthe capital stock. That is, firms will have profit
‘For a further discussion of the revenues and costs that determine
the profitability of investment, see Fazzari (1987).
‘Thiscondition is equivalent tothemaximization of net present value,
under the assumptions made here. I have also assumed that the
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incentives to invest in capital just up to the efficient
level!
EFFICIENCYAND NEUTRAL TAXATION
The main result of the previous section suggests
that the market outcome of firms’ independent, self-
interested investment choices leads to an efficient
capital stock. The analysis that led to this result, how-
ever, ignores the effect of corporate taxes on invest-
ment incentives. This section introduces the in-
fluences of corporate taxes; it provides a theoretical
basis for evaluating the implications of tax reform for
efficient capital investment.
As a general rule, taxes change the economic incen-
tives faced by firms. In the case of the corporate
income tax, however, it is possible, atleast in theory,to
structure the tax so that capital investment decisions
do not change. Rewritingequation 3, we see that firms
will invest up to the point where the economic profits
from a marginal investment project equal zero:
(4) 0=PY—Pji+d).
The right side of equation 4 represents the eco-
nomic profits from a marginal investment. Suppose
these profits are taxedat a rate ‘r. Thenfirms will invest
up to the point where after-tat profits from a marginal
investment aie zero,
0 = (1—i) (PY — Pji + dl], or
(5) (1—tI P1’ = (I —t)[P,Ai + dl]
The levelof capitalinvestment that satisfies equation 4
will also satisfy 5;the same actions that maximize 100
percent of profits will maximize 80 percent, 60 per-
cent, or any non-zero proportion of profits. In this
case, the corporate tax rate affects the portion of a
firm’s profits that go to the government, but it does not
‘The result that unrestricted market interaction leads to efficient
outcomes is often used to argue for the normative position that
market results are socially desirable. This conclusion, however, is
limited in general. Again, the idea that the willingness of individuals
to save at the margin represents the social discount rate takes the
distribution of wealth as given. The efficient capital stock levelwould
likelychange fordifferent wealth distributions. Also, investment may
have external social costs or benefits not recognized by the private
firms that make investment decisions. Thus, private market invest-
ment incentives might differ from social incentives. Finally, this
analysis applies only to general economic equilibrium with full
utilization of resources. Existence of involuntary unemployment or
idle capacity would change the structure of the analysis. Despite
these qualifications, efficiency analysis is widely regarded as rele-
vant to evaluate the long-term impact of the tax system.
affect the firm’s incentives to invest efficiently.’
Economists call this kind of tax neutral. A neutral
tax does not change the allocation of economic re-
sources. The key to neutral taxation in this context is
that all revenues are taxed while all economic ex-
penses are fully deductible.” This result is clear in
theory, but difficult to implement in practice, as we
will now discuss.
U.S. CORPORATE TAXATION
The U.S.corporate tax system is not nearly assimple
as the tax analyzed above. In general, it is not neutral.
Thenext section summarizes the effect ofthe tax code
on the cost of capital. Then, three important non-
neutral aspects of U.S. tax law are discussed: tax de-
preciation schedules, the investment tax credit, and
the deductions allowed for the opportunity cost of
invested capital. Some non-neutralities arising from
personal taxes are considered later.
The Cost ofCapital in the
U.S. Tax System
The efficient capital stock condition given by equa-
tion 5 under neutral taxation assumes that the eco-
nomic costs ofcapitalare fully deductible from taxable
income. For a variety of reasons, however, the U.S. tax
code does not allow deductions based strictly on.
economic costs. This introduces a number of non-
neutral aspects into the tax code. To understand the
source of these non-neutralities, we must compare
the determination of capital investment under the U.S.
tax law with the efficiency standard of a neutral tax
given by equation S.
Letk represent the investment tax credit rate, z the
present value of a one-dollar tax deduction fordepre-
ciation, and Lthe proportion ofa marginal investment
financed with debt (the debt leverage ratio). Suppose
the expected inflation rate is ire. Profit-maximizing
firmswill invest up to the point wherethe least-valued
‘Thisresult assumes that the firm is indifferentbetween internal and
external sources of finance. If this is not thecase, investment may
be affected byreduced cash flow caused byhigher corporate taxes,
even if the tax is neutral in the sense discussed in the text. See
Fazzari (1987) and Fazzari and Athey (1987) forfurther discussion.
“Economic expenses include all the opportunity costs ofbuying and
using capital. They may differ in important respects from accounting
costs used by firms in their financial statements. Interest foregone
on shareholders’ equity, for example, represents an economic op-
portunity cost but is not deducted from the firm’s accounting profit.
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unit of capital purchased satisfies,
(6) (1—’r)PY = P~(I—k—’rz)[i+d— ‘rL(i + li,)]”
The left side of equation 6 is the after-tax benefit
gained from investment, as presented earlier. The
term P,(1 — k — ‘It) on the right side represents the fact
that each dollar spent on investment generates an
investment tax credit of k and a depreciation deduc-
tion with a present value of z.
The other change in equation 6 relative to the neu-
tral tax case in equation 5 is that only explicit interest
costs are deductible from taxable income.Thus, if the
firm finances investment with debt, the explicit inter-
est expense canbe deducted from taxable income, but
the opportunity cost of interest foregone on rein-
vested internal funds or proceeds from new equity
issues cannot be deducted. Furthermore, because
nominal interest is deducted, changes in the inflation
rate will affect thevalue of the interest tax deduction,
to the extent that markets anticipate inflation in the
nominal interest rate.
As equation 6 indicates, the U.S. tax system may
introduce non-neutralities. The complicated expres-
sion on the right side of equation 6 reduces to the
efficient neutral tax given by equation 5 only under
special circumstances. We shall now consider this
point in greater detail.
Depreciation Allowances
In the neutral tax equation 5, economic deprecia-
tion is deducted from taxable income in everyperiod.
In equation 6, the presentvalue of depreciation allow-
ances (z) is treated as a lump-sum deduction that
reduces the after-tax price of capital goods up front.
The two approaches will lead to equivalent results,
however, ifthe depreciation schedule underlying the
calculationofz is the same as economic depreciation.
To find the present value of depreciation allow-
ances that leads to neutral taxation, suppose that
there is no investment tax credit (k=0), the firm
finances marginal investment with debt alone (L~r1)
and expected inflation is zero (‘ii. = 0).Then equation
6 reduces to:
(7) (1— r)PY = P,(1 — i-z)fl1 — rh + d].
“The original reference for the form of the cost of capital given in
equation 6 is Hall and Jorgenson (1967). Further references and a
more-detailed explanation ofthe components of equation 6 can be
found in Fazzari (1987).
To make equation 7 equivalent to the condition de-
scribing efficient investment from equation 5,the mar-
ginal cost of anew unit of capital must be the same in
each case.This implles that the right side ofequation 4
equals the right side of equation 6:
(l—’r)P, (i + dl = P,(l—tz)[(1—’r)i + d].
This equation can be solved for the efficient present
value of depreciation allowances (z’),that is,
(8) z’ = d/[(1—’r)i + d].”
Intuitively, C is the present value of a perpetual
depreciation flow d per dollar of investment. The
discount rate consistsof the after-tax realinterest rate
plus the depreciation rate. The latter term appears
because the amount of depreciation declines as the
asset deteriorates.
The present values of depreciation schedules pre-
scribed by the tax code can be compared with the
efficient benchmark given by C. The first column of
table I gives the efficient present value under the old
and new tax laws.” The efficient present value
changed after tax reform because the corporate tax
rate fell from 46 percent to 34 percent.
The presentvalue ofactual depreciation allowances
prescribed by the tax code are presented in the sec-
ond, third and fourth columns oftable 1, againfor the
old and new tax laws.” Expected inflation plays an
important role here. Neither the old nor the new tax
law indexes depreciation deductions forinflation. As-
suming that higherexpectedinflation increases nomi-
“Equivalently, z’ can be derived by computingthe present value of
economic depreciation deductions discounted at the after-tax real
rate of return (1 —‘r)i. This analysis is complicated if one explicitly
considers the differential tax treatment of dividends and capital
gains where corporate income is distributed to shareholders. See
Auerbach (1983) forfurther discussion.
“The efficient present value (z) calculations in table 1 assume a real
discount rateof 3 percent, before taxes. The economic depreciation
rates for autos and light trucks, office computing and accounting
equipment, and communications equipment were estimated by
Gravelle (1982) as .33, .27 and .12, respectively. The average
economic depreciation rates forequipment and business structures
were .14 and .06 from the Washington University Macro Model
maintained byLaurence H. Meyer and Associates, Ltd.
“See Ott (1984) and Fazzari (1987) for a discussion of how these
present values are computedand the details ofthetax depreciation
schedules. These calculations do not account for the fact that the
depreciablebase for an asset eligible for the investment tax credit
was reduced byone-half of the credit, under the old tax law. This
simplification is made to focus on the effect ofchanging the depreci-
ation schedules alone. It is formally equivalent and conceptually
simpler to think of the reduction in thedepreciation base due to the
investment tax credit as a reduction in thevalue ofthe credit rather
than in the present value ofdepreciation deductions.
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nal interest rates, the present value of a fixed, nominal
depreciation flow decreases with rising expected in-
flation, as shown in table 1.”
With no expected inflation and nominal interest
rates equal to real rates, the tax depreciation sched-
ules generally lead to more generous present values
than the efficient present value.Thus, the rapidwrite-
offs ofcapital goods allowed by the tax codesubsidize
investment in the absence of inflation. Although the
new tax law reduces this subsidy somewhat, the dif-
ferential still remains.
As expected inflation rises, however, the present
values ofactual depreciation allowances decline and
approach theefficientlevel.Thefinal column oftable I
gives the expected inflation rate at which the present
value of the depreciation deduction allowable for tax
purposes equals the efficient level. Under the old tax
law, equipment deductions, on average, would have
“For the calculations in table 1, the before-tax nominal discount rate
is assumed to rise by one percentage point for each percentage-
point increase in the expected inflation rate. A number of econo-
mists have argued that nominal interest rates must increase by
more than the rise in expected inflation to maintain real returns
constant because of personal taxes levied on nominal interest
income. See Darby (1975) and Feldstein (1976), for example. If this
is the case, the present values of depreciation allowances will
decline more than the figures in table 1 indicate when expected
inflation rises.
been efficient with an expected inflation rate of 8.5
percent.After tax reform, this declined to 7.1 percent.’6
The results for business structures are somewhat
different. The rapid structure depreciation allowed
under the old tax law led to a substantial subsidy at
zero expected inflation. Because of its slow deprecia-
tion, however, the present value of nominal deprecia-
tionallowances for structures is especially sensitive to
anychanges in nominalinterest rates caused by rising
expected inflation. Thus, under the old tax law, the
accelerated structures deduction was efficient at a
moderate 3.1 percent expected inflation rate.
Tax reform sharply reduced the present value of
structures depreciation; it increased the tax service
life from 19 to 31.5 years and replaced an accelerated
depreciation schedule with a straight-line schedule.
As table I shows, this pushes depreciation allowances
for business structures to the efficient level at an
expectedinflation rateclose to zero. Even at moderate
levels ofexpected inflation,however, the slow write-off
mandated by the new tax law causes a substantial
“This result is sensitive to the assumption made about the real
before-tax discount rate. If this rate increases from 3 percent to 5
percent, the efficient expected inflation rate for the equipment aver-
age rises from 7.1 percent to 12.0 percent.
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disincentive for structures investment relative to the
efficient level.
The Investment Tax Credit
The depreciation deductions allowed in the tax
code correspond to oneaspect oftheeconomic cost of
using capital. In a neutral tax system, the economic
value of these costs should be deducted from taxable
income. Inefficiency arises from depreciation deduc-
tions only to the extent that the tax depreciation
schedules are more or less generous than economic
depreciation.
The investment tax credit, on theother hand, repre-
sents a direct subsidy to investment. It does not cor-
respond to any aspect ofthe economic cost ofcapital.
By itself, the investment tax credit provides incentives
for firms to purchase more ofthe eligible assets than
the efficiency criterion would dictate. The repeal of
the credit in the new tax law moves the tax system
closer to neutrality.
The investmenttax credit applied to onlyasubset of
capital assets. Thus, thesubsidy not only distorted the
amount of investment, but also the composition of
investment. A detailed analysis ofthis issue lies out-
side the scope of this paper, but efficiencygains from
the repeal of the credit may result from a more effec-
tive allocation of investment among different assets
and activities. Furthermore, inefficient investment
that tookplace as a result ofthe subsidy competed for
scarce funds and raised the interest rate. This could
have crowded out other efficient projects that may
havebeen undertaken in the absence of the subsidy.’~
Ofcourse, given otherdistortions in capital taxation,
some kind of subsidy may beappropriate to offset the
disincentives to investment arisingfrom other aspects
ofthe tax system. As the previous analysis showed, the
equipment assets eligible for the investment tax credit
generally benefit from rapid depreciation deduction
subsidies at low inflation rates evenwith the changes
due to tax reform. Thus, the investment tax credit is
not needed in the current environment to offset the
distortions caused by tax depreciation schedules. The
credit, however, may offset another distorting aspect
of the tax code: firms’ inability to deduct the full
opportunity cost of funds tied up in capital invest-
ment.
‘7The author thanks Milton Friedman for comments on an earlier
paper that emphasized these points.
DebtFinancing and Capital
Cost Deductions
In theneutral tax systemrepresented by equation 5,
the opportunity cost of capital given by the realinter-
est rate Ii) is fully deductible from taxable income. It
does not matterwhether the interest expense involves
explicit payments to debt holders or implicit opportu-
nitycosts offoregoneinterest earnings byequity hold-
ers.” The tax law, however, allows deduction of ex-
plicit interest expense, but does not allow deduction
of interest foregone when investment is financed
through internal cash flow or new equity.
To the extent that new capital spending is not
completely debt-financed, the after-tax cost of capital
rises and investment falls relative to the efficient level.
This effectis reflectedin equation 6b ythefactthat the
deduction for interest expense is multiplied by the
marginal proportion of investment financed by debt
IL). This introduces an important non-neutrality into
the tax system.
At a zero inflation rate, this effect alone gives firms
an incentive to employ less than the efficient level of
capital. But inflation mitigates this distortion. The
economic cost of capital depends on the real interest
rate. The tax code, however, allows firms to deduct
nominal interest expense. As expected inflation and
nominal interest rates rise, therefore, the real value of
tax deductions for interest expenses increases.
At a sufficiently high inflation rate, the tax benefit
from deductions for nominal interest will offset the
increase in the after-tax cost of capital arising because
interest foregone on internal financing cannot be de-
ducted from taxable income. One can solve for the
expected inflation ratethat leads to this efficient result
(ii’) by equating thedeductions for interest expense in
the neutral tax system from equation 5 with the de-
duction in the actual tax system from equation 6:
Ti = ‘rL(i + ‘11’)
This gives
9) ~ =
With a real interest rate of 3 percent and the debt
leverage ratio 30 percent, the efficient inflation rate
from equation 9 is 7 percent.”
“See Fazzari (1987) for a further discussion of debt and equity
finance for capital spending.
“The average corporate debt leverage ratio in the second quarter of
1986 was 30.6 percent according to data from the Washington
University Macro Model.
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Tax reform has a subtle effect on this problem. The
new tax code, like the old law, does not allow deduc-
tions for interest foregone by shareholders. But the
new laweliminates preferential personal tax rates for
capital gains income. Thus, corporations will have an
incentive to pay out a greater proportion of their
income as dividends and finance more new invest-
ment with debt. Thisreduces the efficiencydistortion
caused by the non-deductibility of foregone interest
from internal finance at low inflation rates.”
INVESTMENT NON-NEUTRALITIES
FROM PERSONAL TAXES
The discussion to this point has focused primarily
onthe corporate tax system.But,ultimately, corporate
profits accrue to shareholders who are liable forper-
sonal taxes as well.We shallnow considerthe efléctof
personal taxes on the firm’s incentive to invest infixed
capital.
If personal taxes on all corporate-source income
were uniform, theywouldnot directly affectcorporate
investment decisions because, again, the same actions
that maximize 100percent ofprofits will maximize any
constant proportion ofprofits.” Personal taxes on cor-
porate income, however, are not uniform. In particu-
lar, income from capital galns has been taxed at lower
rates than dividend and interest income.
This lowerrate provides a rather subtle subsidy for
investment. Suppose individualcapital gains are taxed
at a rate ~ while interest income is taxed at the regular
personalrate;. Ifcapital markets equate the after-tax
rate of return on earnings retained by the corporation
with the after-tax interest rate on debt, then:
+ m,) = (I—-r,j(i + ‘~e~’
where i,, is the implicit realinterest rate on corporate
retentions?2Thus, as long as:
i,,,, + it,, = Ii + ir,,))I —‘r~)/)I —‘r,,) < ii + it,).
“Debt finance is beneficial in the sense that it pushes the economy
closer to efficiency at the microeconomic level. On the otherhand,
higher debt ratios can make the macroeconomic system as a whole
less stable. This issue is outside the scope ofthis paper. Forfurther
discussion, see Caskey and Fazzari (1986).
2~Evenuniform personal taxation could have an indirect effect on
investment because the tax on the return from saving will reduce
individual incentives to defer current consumption. This tends to
raise real interestrates and increase the opportunitycost ofcapital.
This issue is considered later in the article.
“This approachfollows Henderson (1988), p. 23. It ignores any risk
premium required by investors in corporate equity.
The favorable treatment of capital gains income leads
to a subsidized rate ofinterest for investmentfinanced
with retained earnings.
Let us integrate this effect into the cost of capital
formula. As before, assume that the firm finances a
fraction L ofmarginal investments with debt and 1 — L
with retained earnings. Theweighted average nominal
opportunity cost offunds the firm faces is:
1—i
(10) c = (1—U) )(i+ir,) + L(I—i)(i+ir,).”
I
The firm’s cost of capital is then:
(II) P0(1—k--tz)(c it, + d).
Equation 11 reduces to the right side of equation 6
when the personaltax rate on capitalgains equals the
personal tax rate on regular income (t,, =
Capital Gains Taxation After
Tax Reform
Taxreform has fundamentallychanged the terms of
the capital gains subsidy by repealing the 60 percent
exclusion for capital gains income. This change, how-
ever, does not mean that the personal tax advantages
ofcapital gains income has been removed. Sharehold-
ers that receive capital gains income still benefit from
the deferral of tax until the time the asset is sold and
the capital gain is realized.
The effectivetax rate on capital gains income, there-
fore, depends on the length of time an investor holds
an asset. One can compute ‘r,, as the present value of
the tax paid at realization per dollar of capital gain
discounted at the individual’s after-tax real interest
rate:
(12) ~,, = (1— p.) i-,I[1 + (1 —‘r~)i]”,
where p. is the proportion of capital gains income
excluded from tax and H is the holding period.’4
“Equation 10 is based on two simplifying assumptions. First, no
marginal investment is financed with newshare issues. According to
Henderson (1986), new shares account for only 4.9 percent ofthe
U.S. capital spending finance. Second, and moreimportantly, equa-
tion 8 assumes that the earnings from marginal, internally financed
investments are completely retained and will be taxed as capital
gains. This analysis is complicated by dividends. See Auerbach
(1983) for further discussion.
‘4This equation is a simplification. In general, the accrual-equivalent
capital gains tax rate depends on the rate of growth of the asset’s
value and the holding period in a more complicated way. Further
complications arise because capital gains not realized before the
asset holder’s death may escape taxation. Also, much capital gains
income is realized by tax-exempt or tax-deferred funds such as
pensions or individual retirement accounts. See Auerbach (1983),
pp. 919—20 for further discussion and references.
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As we can see fi’om equation 10, the effect of the
capital gains personal tax subsidy depends on the
ratio 1—;)i(i — i-a,). Ifthe personaltax rate on interest
income equals the tax rate on capital gains income,
this ratio will be unity, and equation 10 gives the same
opportunity cost of funds that was derived in the
absence of personal tax considerations.
This ratio, however, is not equal to unity.Assuming
an average marginal personal tax rate on ordinary
income of28 percent, a60 percent capital gains exclu-
sion, a 3 percent real after-tax discount rate, and a 10-
year holding period for long-term capital gains, the
ratio (1 —‘r~)/(i —‘r,,) was 0.78 for the old tax law. This
figure is based on an effective capital gains tax rate of
8.3 percent from equation 12. Removingthe 60 percent
capital gains exclusion and lowering the personal tax
rate to 22 percent gives an effective capital gains tax
rateof16.4 percentand a ratio (1 — ‘r,,)/(i — tg) of0.93 for
the newtax law.”
Under a completely neutral tax system, all personal
income would be taxed equivalently; so (1— ;)/(l —
would equalunity. Thus, taxreform moves the system
toward neutrality from this perspective alone.
TAX REFORM AND EFFICIENCY: AN
OVERALLASSESSMENT
The preceding sections of this article analyzed a
number of non-neutral features of U.S. capital taxa-
tion. The effect of tax reform on each of these non-
neutralities was considered separately. This section
provides an overall assessment ofwhether tax reform
has brought capital taxation closer to the efficiency
standard.
Table 2 providesone perspective on the efficiencyof
the tax law, before and after tax reform. The figures
show the ratio of the actual after-tax cost of capital to
theefficient cost ofcapital underneutral taxation.The
calculations are based on the assumption that thereal
interest rate firmsface in the market reflects the social
opportunity cost ofproviding capital.” Thus, this ratio
“These resultswere not changed much byincreasing the real, after-
tax discount rate to 5 percent, or shortening the holding period to5
years. With the maximum marginal personal tax rates, however,
greater subsidies result. The (1 —w,)/(1 -T,~)ratio was 0.59for the
old law and 0.89for the new law.
“Thisratio is computed as the actual costof capital from equation 11,
(1 — k — Tz)(c — 7r~±d), where c is defined in equation 10, to the cost
of capital under neutral taxation from the right side of equation 5,
(1 —i)O+ d). The investment tax credit rates are adjusted to reflect
the fact that the depreciation base for an asseteligible for the credit
was reduced by one-half of the credit. Thus, k = k,(1 — 0.5 rz),
where k, is the statutory investment tax credit rate.
This ratio measures the extent of the tax distortion
ofcapital costs. If the ratio is unity, there is no distor-
tion, and the tax system is neutral for that class of
asset. A ratio less than one indicates that the tax
system encourages investment relative to the efficient
rate;a ratio greater thanone shows that the tax system
discourages investment relative to the efficient rate.
The effects of tax reform on equipment tax distor-
tions are striking. Under the old tax law, the system
provided a subsidy to equipment investment: the ra-
tios are less than one. This was due primarily to the
investment tax credit. Under the new law) the treat-
ment of equipment approaches remarkably close to
tax neutrality. The results presented in table 2 are
based on a 3 percent real interest rate, a 4 percent
expected inflation rateand a 30 percent marginal debt
leverage ratio. Qualitatively similar results for equip-
ment asset classes are obtained for a wide range of
assumptions about these parameters.
For business structures, the result appears less fa-
vorable. The generous depreciation allowances for
structures under the old tax law caused the after--tax
cost of capital to fall below the efficient level forstruc-
tures as well as equipment. By sharply reducing the
value ofstructures’ depreciation allowances, however,
tax reform pushes the after-tax cost of structures’
capital well above the efficient level.
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The excessive taxation of business structures, how-
ever, may not be as large as the figures in table 2
suggest. The calculations assume that all investment
is financedwith the average 30 percent debt leverage
ratio. But structure debt leverage ratios are probably
higherthan the average, because collateral value pro-
vided by structures is more easily realized than the
values offirm-specific equipment. Higher leverage ra-
tios reduce the cost of capital because interest ex-
pense is tax deductible. If the leverage ratio for struc-
tures reaches 50 percent to 70 percent (the exact value
depends on expected inflation), structures taxation
will be neutral, even under the new tax depreciation
schedules.’~
The results presented in table 2 reflect the efficiency
oftaxes on firms’ capital alonebecausethe real market
interest rate was assumed to reflect the social oppor-
tunity cost of capital. As mentioned earlier, however,
individuals pay personal taxes on interest income.
Thus, the market interest rate exceeds the return
required by savers. Suppose that savers require an
after-tax rate of return ofr. Because nominalinterest is
taxed, the nominal market interest rate Ii+ it,) must
satisfiy:
(13) r = (i+ir,)(i—t,) — it,
to give saversan after-tax realrate ofreturn equal to r.”
This changes the comparison between the actual
and efficient cost ofcapital in afundamentalway. The
efficient cost of capital is based on the social discount
rate r, while firms must pay a higher real interest rate
in the market to compensate savers for the personal
taxes they pay on interest income. To reach efficiency
according to this perspective, therefore, investment
must receive tax subsidies that stimulate capital
spending sufficientlyto offset the disincentives tosav-
ing arising from taxes on personal interest income.
Table 3 presents tax ratios that incorporate this
effect. The results aredifferent from those in table 2 for
thecapital tax system alone. The investment subsidies
forequipment in the oldtax lawled toan effectivecost
of capital that still fell below the after-tax opportunity
“If the leverage ratio is higher than average forstructures, it must be
lower than average for equipment. For example, a5 0percent
structuresleverage ratio would imply about 20 percent equipment
leverage to obtain a weighted average of 30 percent because
approximately two-thirds of investment consists of equipment. Re-
ducing the leverage ratio to 20 percent for equipment, however,
does not substantiallychange the results presented in this article.







cost ofsavers, although thetax ratios for theold law in
table 3 are closer to unity than in table 2. ‘I’he cost of
capital for structures that were ineligible for the in-
vestment tax credit, however, was well above the ef-
ficient level,evenwith the old law’s generous depreci-
ation allowance. By removingthe capital subsidies, tax
reform increased the cost of capital abovethe efficient
level in all cases. To the extent that investment subsi-
dies are desirable to offset the disincentive to saving
caused by personal taxes on interest, tax reform does
not improve efficiency.
One also should note that thetax distortions for the
new law become worse at higher expected inflation
rates. This is because personal taxes are levied on
nominal interest income. As expected inflation and
nominal interest rates rise, therefore, the premium
required to maintain individuals’ after-tax real return
on saving rises evenfaster.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article has analyzed the effect of the Tax Re-
formAct of1986 on the efficiency ofU.S. capitalforma-
tion.The results leave little doubt that the old tax law
subsidized equipment investment. Tax reform re-
moved these subsidies, especially the investment tax
credit. Now,thetax system causes the after-tax cost of
capital to correspond closely to economic deprecia-
tion and market rates of interest. Tax reform appar-
ently moves equipment taxation close to neutrality, in
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the sense that the after-tax cost of capital reflects real
economic depreciation and realmarket interest rates.
For structures, however, an apparent subsidy due to
generous depreciation allowances under the old tax
law was morethan offset by taxreform. Now the taxon
structures is substantially higher than the level con-
sistent with neutrality.
From a broader perspective, however, some invest-
ment subsidies were necessary to attain an efficient
allocation of resources between consumption and
capital formation. Because personalinterest income is
subject to tax, many economists have argued that the
market interest rate overstates the social opportunity
cost of investing in capital. Thus, investment subsi-
dies, like those in the old tax law, can offset the
disincentive to saving arising frompersonal taxes.
One might argue that the distortion caused by per-
sonal taxes on interest income should be dealt with
directly rather than by subsidizingcapital investment.
The lower personal tax rates resulting from tax reform
accomplish this to some extent, although this effect is
offset by higher taxes on capital gains and tighter
restrictions on IRA benefits. Thus, tax reform’s impli-
cations forthe efficient allocation of current resources
between investment and consumption remain ambig-
uous.
REFERENCES
Aaron, Henry J. “The Impossible Dream ComesTrue: The New Tax
ReformAct,” The ArookingsReview (Winter 1987), pp. 3—10.
Auerbach, Alan J. “Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy and the
CostofCapital,”JournalofEconomic Uterature (September1983),
pp. 905—40.
Darby, Michael R. “The Financial and Tax Effects of Monetary
Policy on Interest Rates,” Economic lnqui,y (June 1975), pp. 266—
76.
Economic Report of the President. (U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1987).
Fazzari, Steven M. “Tax Reform and Investment: How Big an
Impact?” this Review (January 1987), pp. 15—27.
Fazzari, Steven M., and Michael J. Athey. “Asymmetric Informa-
tion, Financing Constraints, and Investment,” Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics (forthcoming, 1987).
Fazzari, Steven M., and John P. Caskey. ‘Macroeconomics and
Credit Markets,” Joumal ofEconomicIssues (June 1986), pp. 421—
29.
Feldstein, Martin. “Inflation, IncomeTaxes and the Rate of Interest:
A Theoretical Analysis,” American Economic Review (December
1976), pp. 809—20.
Gravelle, Jane 0. “Effects of the 1981 Depreciation Revisions on
the Taxation ofIncome from Business Capital.” National Tax Jour-
nal (February 1982), pp.1—20.
Hall, Robert, and Dale Jorgenson. ‘Tax Policy and Investment
Behavior,” American Economic Review(June 1987), pp. 391—414.
Henderson, Yolanda. “Lessons from Federal Reform of Business
Taxes,” New England Economic Reyiew (November/December
1986), pp. 9—25.
Prakken, Joel L. “The Macroeconomics ofTax Reform,” presented
at the American Council forCapital Formation conference entitled
“The Consumption Tax: A Better Alternative?” September 3—5,
1986, Washington, D.C.
Ott, Mack. “Depreciation, Inflation and Investment Incentives: The
Effectsof the Tax Acts of 1981 and 1982,” this Review(November
1984), pp. 17—30.
33